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Abstract— Dynamic conferencing refers to a scenario
wherein any subset of users in a universe of users
form a conference for sharing confidential information
among themselves. The key distribution (KD) problem
in dynamic conferencing is to compute a shared secret
key for such a dynamically formed conference. In
literature, the KD schemes for dynamic conferencing either
are computationally unscalable or require communication
among users, which is undesirable. The extended
symmetric polynomial based dynamic conferencing scheme
(ESPDCS) is one such KD scheme which has a high
computational complexity that is universe size dependent.
In this paper we present an enhancement to the
ESPDCS scheme to develop a KD scheme called universe-
independent SPDCS (UI-SPDCS) such that its complexity is
independent of the universe size. However, the UI-SPDCS
scheme does not scale with the conference size. We propose
a relatively scalable KD scheme termed as DH-SPDCS that
uses the UI-SPDCS scheme and the tree-based group Diffie-
Hellman (TGDH) key exchange protocol. The proposed
DH-SPDCS scheme provides a configurable trade-off
between computation and communication complexity of the
scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
Research on secure communications has mostly
focused on two-party and recently on group
communications (multi-party). In a secure group
communication (SGC) setting, a group of two or
more users share information secretly such that any
user not in the group cannot glean or manipulate any
information being shared. Achieving security in group
communications is more difficult than in point-to-point
communications. Various schemes have been proposed
for key distribution in secure group communications,
such as key-tree based schemes, tree-based group
Diffie-Hellman (TGDH), Iolus, dual encryption protocol
(DEP), DIstributed Scalable sEcure Communication
(DISEC), and a suite of n-party Diffie-Hellman key
exchange schemes (refer to [1] for details).
The universe of users is represented by set U of size n.
Any set of users from U can form a dynamic conference
to share confidential information among themselves.
The number of potential dynamic conferences possible
in a universe of n users is (2n − (n + 1)), which
is exponential in number. A user can participate in
more than one conference at the same time. All or
any number of dynamic conferences can co-exist in the
system at the same time. A burst of users can join or
leave a conference. Following the join/leave operations,
the conference key needs to be updated to maintain
backward/forward secrecy. The size of the dynamic
conference can vary in the range [2 − n]. In most cases
the conference size c is c << n.
Let us discuss the inherent complexity of the
key distribution/computation (KD) problem in dynamic
conferencing (DC). Each user can potentially belong to
half the number of conferences. Evidently, scalability
is one of the most important issues for the KD problem
in DC. A key distribution scheme (KDS) for DC should
allow a user to compute shared secret keys for all
the conferences that he/she belongs to. At the same
time, the scheme should prevent a user, having the
knowledge of conference keys of all the conferences
he/she belongs, from computing shared secret keys
of the other conferences he/she does not belong to.
Such a dynamic conferencing scheme is said to be 1-
secure. Similarly, in a w-secure key distribution scheme
for dynamic conferencing even if w users collude and
pool together all their information (shared secret keys
or any other) they should not be able to compute
secret keys of any of the conferences that they do not
belong to. Other important features of a KD scheme
for DC include maintaining forward/backward secrecy,
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efficient handling of bursty join/leave operations, and
minimizing the interaction among users for shared secret
key computation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II discusses the available schemes in the literature for
dynamic conferencing and our motivation of our work.
In Section III we present KD scheme called UI-SPDCS
whose computational complexity is independent of the
size of the universe. In Section IV we discuss the
TGDH scheme and present our DH-SPDCS scheme. In
Section V we present a security analysis of the proposed
DH-SPDCS scheme. Section VI discusses the results
of simulation of DH-SPDCS for dynamic conferencing.
Section VII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK AND MOTIVATION
In this section we survey a few key distribution
schemes available in the literature for dynamic
conferencing (DC) and describe their advantages
and disadvantages. All the KDS schemes can be
classified into two main classes. The Class 1 KDS
schemes [11]-[15] are used for securing large dynamic
conferences but they require interaction among the users
in the dynamic conference for computing the common
secret key of the conference. The second class of KDS
schemes are used for securing small and medium scale
dynamic conferences but they require no communication
among the users to compute the shared conference key.
The Class 1 KDS schemes include, the interval based
scheme [7], the unconditionally secure dynamic
conference scheme [6], asymmetric encryption
algorithms using public key encryptions [5], the
secure lock scheme [5]. These scheme have issues such
as lack of scalability, inefficient key computation, no
support for join/leave operations, etc.
Blom in [8] presented a symmetric key generation
system for two-party communication using (n, k) MDS
linear codes where n is the universe size and k is
the security parameter. The amount of information
stored by each user is bounded by (k × log q) bits.
In [9], Matsumoto et al., extended Blom’s MDS based
scheme to general symmetric t-linear mappings (GSM)
for dynamic conferences of size t in a universe of n users.
Blundo et al., in [4], proposed a symmetric polynomial
based dynamic conferencing scheme (SPDCS) for
dynamic conferences of size t. The computational
complexity of the SPDCS scheme is O((w + 1)t), which
is pseudo polynomial assuming that t is an arbitrary
constant that specifies the size of the conference. One of
the disadvantages of this scheme is that for a particular
key distribution scheme exactly t users have to form a
secure group: no more, no less. Therefore we need a
different scheme for every choice of t users in a group.
In [2], Zou et al., proposed an extension to the
SPDCS scheme called ESPDCS where any group of
t ≤ n users from a universe can compute the shared
secret key. The computational complexity of ESPDCS
is O((w + 1)n), which is clearly exponential in the size
of the universe n. In the next section we propose
a KD scheme called universe independent symmetric
polynomial based dynamic conferencing scheme (UI-
SPDCS) based on the ESPDCS scheme to reduce its
complexity from O((w + 1)n) to O((w + 1)k) where k
is the maximum size of any conference in a universe U
of users.
III. THE UNIVERSE-INDEPENDENT SPDCS
(UI-SPDCS)
The universe-independent symmetric polynomial
based dynamic conferencing scheme (UI-SPDCS) is a
generalization of the ESPDCS scheme. Let us present
the UI-SPDCS key distribution scheme for a universe
U = {u1, u2, . . . un} of size n with security parameter
w ≤ n − 2. Let q be a prime integer such that q ≥ n
and GF(q) be the Galois Field of q. To setup a key
distribution scheme the central trusted authority (CTA)
chooses n + k random numbers S = {s1, s2, . . . sn}
and S′ = {s′1, s′2, . . . s′k} in GF(q) and a symmetric
polynomial f(x1, . . . , xk) in k variables and degree w in
each variable with coefficients in GF (q). The CTA is not
one of the users in U and is only active during the setup
phase of the key distribution scheme. The S and S′ are
made public and the symmetric polynomial is kept secret
and is known only to the CTA.
A polynomial f(x1, . . . , xk) (see Eqn.1) is symmetric
if and only if ai1,...,ik = aπ(i1),...,π(ik) for all monomials
ai1,...,inx
i1
1 , . . . , x
ik
k in f and all permutations π of
1, . . . , k.
f(x1, . . . xk) =
w∑
i1=0
· · ·
w∑
ik=0
ai1,...,ikx
i1
1 · · ·xikk . (1)
Therefore, if f(x, y, z) is a symmetric polynomial then
f(x, y, z) = f(y, z, x) = f(z, x, y). For example
f(x, y, z) = x + y + z + 2xy + 2yz + 2zx is a
symmetric polynomial. The secret polynomial f consists
of (w + 1)k terms. For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the CTA computes
a polynomial gi in k − 1 variables gi = f(x1 =
si, x2, . . . , xk) by substituting x1 = si and sends it
secretly to user ui. The resulting polynomial gi is also
symmetric and contains at most (w + 1)n−1 terms. The
coefficients of gi comprise the secret information share
which is given to user ui. Each user ui is assigned public
values si and private share gi.
Now, any subset of members of size t ≤ k can
compute a shared secret key. Let us suppose that
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users in the set {u1, u2, . . . ut} are forming a dynamic
conference. The conference key is calculated by each
participating user ui by substituting the public S values
of each of the other users in the conference in place of
variable x′js in the secret polynomial of gi of user ui.
The remaining k − t variables in the polynomial gi are
substituted by the first (k−t) S′ values. Since polynomial
f is symmetric f(s1, s2, . . . , st, s′1, . . . , s′k−t) =
gi(s1, s2, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , st, s′1, . . . , s
′
k−t) for
all 1 ≤ i ≤ t. Though, in the above example we
have considered the conference with the first t users
s1, s2, . . . , st of the universe the scheme holds for any
set of at most k users. The UI-SPDCS scheme has all the
advantages of the ESPDCS scheme and its complexity
is only ((w + 1)k), independent of the size of the
universe. The scheme is w-secure where collusion of any
k members k ≤ w, cannot break the system security.
The security of the UI-SPDCS scheme follows directly
from the security of the basic SPDCS scheme.
A user ui can compute a secret key for himself by
substituting xj with s′j in his secret polynomial gi for all
j = i. Since no other user knows the polynomial gi the
secret key for ui cannot be computed by any other user
in the universe. This self secret key computation is used
in the DH-SPDCS scheme, discussed later in Section IV.
The computational complexity of the UI-SPDCS scheme
is O((w+1)k) which is still exponential in the size of the
conference. In the next section we present a KD scheme
that uses both the UI-SPDCS scheme and the Tree-based
Group Diffie-Hellman (TGDH) key exchange protocol to
further scale the size of the conference.
IV. DIFFIE-HELLMAN AND UI-SPDCS BASED
DYNAMIC CONFERENCING SCHEME (DH-SPDCS)
In this section we present our KD scheme for dynamic
conferencing that uses the UI-SPDCS scheme and the
TGDH protocol. The DH-SPDCS key distribution
scheme for dynamic conferencing in a universe of n
users is implemented in three phases, namely universe
partitioning phase, setup phase and key computation
phase. We now discuss each of the three phases of the
DH-SPDCS KD scheme in detail.
A. Universe Partitioning Phase
The universe U of n users is partitioned into m virtual
partitions Λ = {T1, T2, . . . Tm} such that each user in
U belongs to exactly one virtual partition. Formally,
for all i, j such that i = j, Ti ∩ Tj = φ and
∪mi=1Ti = U . The number of users in virtual partition
Ti is represented by ni. The maximum number of
users in a partition can be bounded by a threshold
value depending upon the bounded requirement on the
key computation time of dynamic conferencing within
a partition. The partitioning of the universe can be
uniform where all the m partitions have equal number
of users (with the exception that the last partition may
have more/less number of users if n is not a multiple of
m). The universe can also be partitioned non-uniformly
based on various criteria such as temporal proximity,
frequent dynamic conferencing, adversarial collaboration
etc. Members of an organization conferencing more
frequently can be grouped into a single partition. The
members in an organization that are likely to collaborate
can be partitioned into different groups. We will describe
in the later sections that the security of the proposed
DH-SPDCS scheme is only vulnerable to users colluding
within the same partition.
B. Setup Phase
In the setup phase, the CTA does the initialization of
the UI-SPDCS scheme for each partition in the universe
independently. For each partition Ti, the CTA considers
the users in partition Ti as a universe in itself and
initializes the UI-SPDCS scheme Ψi. The security
parameter of each partition Ti is configured depending
upon the number of users in the partition and specific
security requirements of the partition. Let wi, wi ≤
ni−1, be the security parameter of the partition Ti. Most
of the overhead involved with UI-SPDCS is during the
setup phase that is done offline. The CTA also computes
the Diffie-Hellman key tree and gives it to each user in
the conference. All the users belonging to one partition
are associated to one leaf node in the DH key tree. The
number of leaf nodes of the DH key tree is equal to the
number of partitions of the universe.
Algorithm 1 COMPUTE-KEY(U,Λ, S)
1: if (S ⊆ Ti) for some Ti ∈ Λ then
2: Compute shared secret key KS of S using SPDCS
Ψi of partition Ti
3: else
4: for Ti ∈ Λ do
5: Compute Si = S ∩ Ti
6: if Si = φ then
7: Compute shared secret key KSi of Si using
SPDCS Ψi of partition Ti
8: else
9: Let KSi = 1
10: end if
11: end for
12: Using (KS1 ,KS2 , . . .KSm) as secret keys of the
m leaf nodes in the DH key tree of TGDH,
compute root key
13: end if
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C. Key Computation Phase
In this section we will discuss how to compute the
shared secret key of a subset S of users from the universe
U . Algorithm 1 outlines the conference key computation
using DH-SPDCS. If all the users in the subset S belong
to one single virtual partition Ti i.e., S ⊆ Ti the secret
key KS of the conference is computed using UI-SPDCS
of the partition Ti. The key KS is computed without any
interaction between users in the dynamic conference S.
We call such a conference key as intra partition key. By
limiting the maximum number of users in a partition, the
intra partition key computation time is bounded.
Let a dynamic conference S span across multiple
partitions. The shared secret key of such a dynamic
conference is called inter partition key. Let Si be the
set of users in the dynamic conference S that belong
to partition Ti. The users in each set Si corresponding
to partition Ti compute their intra partition key KSi
independently and in parallel using their corresponding
UI-SPDCS scheme Φi. If Si = φ then intra partition
key of Si is 0 and the corresponding public key is 1. If
|Si| = 1, the user can compute a secret key for himself
which no other user/s can compute. Nodes in each
partition knowing its private share and the DH key tree
can compute the shared secret of the dynamic conference
S using the TGDH scheme.
The tree-based group Diffie-Hellman (TGDH) [10] is
a protocol to compute a shared secret key for secure
group communication. The TGDH key distribution
protocol specifies how a user, knowing only his secret
key and a binary key tree, computes the shared secret key
of the group. The advantage of the TGDH scheme is that
there is no central authority. The binary key tree is known
to every user in the group and is called the Diffie-Hellman
(DH) key tree. The TGDH scheme also specifies how
to recompute the shared secret key after user join/leave
operations.
D. Bursty Join/Leave Events
In this section we discuss the key re-computation
when one or more users join or leave a conference.
Following the bursty join/leave event, the secret share
of the members of each partition needs to be re-
computed. Depending upon the number of members
from each partition joining or leaving the conference
we have four different cases. The initial conference as
well as the resulting conference can be a conference
with all the members belonging to a single partition or
members belong to more than one partition. In any of
the cases, the conference key updating is same as the
conference key computation assuming that the resulting
conference is a new conference. If in the resulting
conference, members belong to a single partition then
the conference key is computed using the UI-SPDCS
key distribution scheme corresponding to that partition.
But if the resulting conference has members spanning
across multiple partitions then the conference keys of the
members belonging to each partition are recomputed in
parallel which correspond to the secret keys of the leaf
nodes in the DH key tree. After updating the key shares
of the leaf nodes in the DH key tree the new shared secret
key is computed using the TGDH key exchange protocol.
E. Evaluation
Table IV-C summarizes the important features of
dynamic conferencing that the DH-SPDCS scheme
supports, in comparison with other schemes. DH-SPDCS
allows distributed key computation (with little or no
interaction), efficient join/leave and is computationally
secure. It is also more scalable in comparison to
other schemes. DH-SPDCS thus proves to be a
major improvement from its earlier counterpart namely
ESPDCS and also other available schemes. The UI-
SPDCS scheme is an improvement to the ESPDCS
scheme in terms of the universe size scalability.
V. ANALYSIS OF SECURITY OF DH-SPDCS
In this section we present a preliminary analysis of the
security of the DH-SPDCS scheme.
A. Security of DH-SPDCS
If wi is the security parameter of the UI-SPDCS KDS
for the partition Ti then wi + 1 users inside the partition
Ti need to collude to break the security of the UI-SPDCS.
But the security of the UI-SPDCS of a partition Ti cannot
be compromised by the collusion of any number of users
from other partitions Tj where i = j. The security
parameter of the DH-SPDCS scheme for all the dynamic
conferences within a partition Ti is given by a tuple
〈wl, wg〉 where wl represents the threshold for security
against the maximum number of colluding users inside
the partition and wg represents the threshold for security
against the maximum number of colluding users outside
the partition Ti. For this scheme wl = wi and wg = ∞
but the maximum number of users in universe U outside
the partition Ti is n− ni. Hence wg = (n− ni − 1).
Let us now consider the security of the DH-SPDCS
scheme for dynamic conferences that span more than
one partition in Λ. Let S be a dynamic conference
that spans m partitions TS = {Ti1 , Ti2 , . . . Tim} in
Λ of the universe U . The security parameter of the
DH-SPDCS scheme for dynamic conference S spanning
m partitions TS ⊆ Λ, is given by a (m + 1)-tuple
〈wi1 , wi2 , . . . wim , wg〉 where wij represents threshold
for security against the maximum number of colluding
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Universe Size Scalability No Distributed Join/Leave Computational
Independence Communication Key Security
Uncond. Secure ✕ ✕  ✕ ✕ 
Public Key Based  ✕ ✕ ✕  ✕
Interval Based ✕ ✕ ✕ ✕  
Secure Lock  ✕ ✕ ✕  ✕
ESPDCS ✕ ✕  ✕  
UI-SPDCS  ✕  ✕  
DH-SPDCS  * ✕   
TABLE I
DYNAMIC CONFERENCING SCHEMES AND PROPERTIES. ∗ PARTIALLY SCALABLE.
users inside the partition Tij and wg represents the
threshold for security against the maximum number of
colluding users outside the partitions TS involved in the
conference S. To break the security of such a system one
has to break the security of UI-SPDCS of at least one of
the partitions TS in Λ which have at least one user from
the conference S. We know that if wk is the security
parameter of the UI-SPDCS for key distribution in the
partition Tk then wk+1 users need to collude to break the
security of the UI-SPDCS. For the dynamic conference
S, wg = n−
∑im
j=i1
nij .
VI. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We implemented SPDCS and DH-SPDCS on an SGI
Origin 300 computer, which has 32 processors and 16 GB
of RAM. The machine has a 5th minute load average1 of
around 40%. The scheme was implemented in C++ along
with the GMP (GNU’s Multiple Precision) library and
POSIX thread libraries. Below we discuss and compare
the results of DH-SPDCS with the results of SPDCS. The
simulation is run for 5 sets of 30 random events with
security parameter w = 1.
A. Results
During a simulation we assume that universe size is
constant. In all our simulations, we uniformly partition
the universe into m = 6 partitions and hence the
tree structure of DH-SPDCS remains the same. The
size of the universe varies in the range 12 to 90 and
correspondingly the number of users in each partition n
in the range 2 to 15.
We use the time taken to compute the conference key
as a measure of performance. The average time taken
by all the members in a conference to compute the intra
partition key using the UI-SPDCS scheme is referred
to as timeigk. Let us term the average time taken by
15th minute load average: This values indicates the average number
of processes competing for getting scheduled on one of the CPUs during
the 5 minutes while simulation was running on the machine.
all the users in the conference to compute the root key
using the TGDH protocol as timerk. The root key is the
conference key which only the users in the conference
can compute. The average total time required to compute
the conference key by all the users in the conference is
timeck = timeigk + timerk.
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Fig. 1. Conference key computation time for a single member;
Description of curves: 1. timeigk , 2. timerk , and 3. timeck
Figure 1 plots all the three curves namely timeigk,
timerk, and timeck are referred to as curve 1, 2 and 3
respectively. Assuming that users do not collude, the
security parameter for all the UI-SPDCS schemes of all
the partitions is set to 1. Though the x-axis shows the
number of users in the universe varying from 12 to 96 the
number of users in each partition of the universe varies
from 2 to 15. Therefore at x = 90, the curve 1 shows
that the time taken by UI-SPDCS for computing intra
partition key with only 15 users in the partition averaged
over all the 6 partitions of the universe. The curve 1
shows that timeigk increases exponentially with n. It
has also been observed that for values of n greater than
15 (not shown in the graph) the key computation time
increases beyond practical feasibility and is not suitable
for real world applications. Hence during the simulation
of DH-SPDCS we limit the value of n to 15. The curve
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2 in Figure 1 plots the time taken to compute the root
key using the TGDH protocol (timerk) having computed
the secret of the leaf nodes of the DH key tree using
UI-SPDCS. The curve 2 shows that the time timerk
curve is linear and increases very slowly with the increase
in the number of users in a partition. And finally the
curve 3 plots the average total time taken to compute the
conference key by all the users in the conference using
DH-SPDCS (timeck).
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Fig. 2. Comparison between SPDCS and DH-SPDCS.
Figure 2 shows the time taken to compute the
conference key for the SPDCS and DH-SPDCS schemes.
The graph clearly shows that when the number of users
in the universe increases to 20 the time taken by SPDCS
to compute the conference key increases to more than
5, 000ms. In contrast the time taken by our proposed
DH-SPDCS even when the size of the universe is 90
is just over 500ms. This clearly substantiates the huge
improvement in scalability of DH-SPDCS scheme in
comparison to SPDCS.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we studied the key distribution problem
for dynamic conferencing in a universe of users.
The ESPDCS scheme is a key distribution scheme
for dynamic conferencing that allows us to compute
the secret keys for dynamic conferences without user
interaction. In this work we presented an enhancement
to the ESPDCS scheme such that it is scalable with the
size of the universe – the universe independent SPDCS
(UI-SPDCS) scheme. In this work we proposed a KD
scheme for dynamic conferencing termed as DH-SPDCS
that uses the UI-SPDCS scheme and the tree-based group
Diffie-Hellman (TGDH) protocol. We presented an
analysis of the security of the DH-SPDCS scheme. We
simulated DH-SPDCS and found that it increases the
range of the ESPDCS scheme. However, the scalability
is attained at the expense of increased computational
complexity in shared key computation.
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